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IV INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
CLAUDIA MARTN
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter 'Inter-American
Commission' or 'Commission') has submitted substantially more cases for
consideration by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (hereinafter 'Inter-
American Court' or 'Court') since the amendment of its Regulations in 2001. As a
result, the Court decides more cases and issues more judgements, making the
reporting on every case decided by this regional court more difficult. Therefore, in
the future, this section will mainly focus on the relevant developments in the case law
of the Court and will only refer to the facts of the cases if necessary. As in previous
years, however, I will continue to list the cases decided in the corresponding period
for informational purposes.
During the period covered by this report, the Court issued several decisions on
the merits, which include: De la Cruz Flores vs Peru, Carpio Nicolle vs Guatemala, Lori
Berenson Mejia vs Peru, Hermanas Serrano Cruz vs Peru, Huilca Tecse vs Peru, Masacre de
Mapiripdn vs Colombia, and Caesar vs Trinidad y Tobago. Moreover, the Court
continues to review requests for Advisory Opinion 19 and 20, submitted by Venezuela
and the Inter-American Commission, respectively.
The present report will analyse current developments in the case law of the Court
regarding de novo review of admissibility issues, the scope of the jurisdiction rationae
temporis of the Court and the protection afforded by the right to freedom of
expression under the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter
'American Convention' or 'Convention').
The full text of the decisions mentioned in this report can be found in the
website of the Inter-American Court at www.corteidh.or.cr.
1. DE NOVO REVIEW OF ADMISSIBILITY ISSUES
Since its initial decision in Veldsquez Rodriguez,1 the Court has asserted itsjurisdiction
to review all aspects of a case, including 'the procedural rules thatjustify its hearing a
case and (...) all procedural norms involved in the 'interpretation or application of
(the) Convention'. On this basis, the Court developed a practice for reviewing de
novo admissibility issues, particularly those related to the exhaustion of domestic
remedies already adjudicated by the Commission. This review was initiated by the
submission of preliminary objections from the concerned State. The de novo review
of admissibility issues was criticised because it added to the existing time delay for
the Court to decide cases once submitted for consideration.
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Veldsquez Rodrigu Case, Preliminary Objections,
Judgement of 26June 1987, Series C, No. 1, para. 29.
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Most recently, however, in Herrera Ulloa, Tibi and Serrano Cruz? the Court appears
to have reversed this practice by ruling that the findings of the Commission must be
given weight unless there is reason that justifies reexamination. The importance of
this new approach is undeniable; however, to avoid duplications and additional
delays, the Court should also consider making use of the provision in its Regulations
denoting appropriate weight to the assessment of the evidence made by the Inter-
American Commission.3
2. SCOPE OF THE JURISDICTION RATIONAE TEMPORIS OF THE
COURT
In the Serrano Cruz Case vs El Salvador, the Court revisited the issue regarding its
jurisdiction rationae temporis to hear a case on forced disappearances which occurred
before the accused State accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the Court. The
Court had the chance to review this issue in Blakevs Guatemala, but decided the case
on other facts. Also, the issue was present in Trujillo Oroza vs BoliviaP and Molina
Theissen vs Peru,6 but the States involved accepted international responsibility for the
alleged disappearances and therefore the Court never had to rule on its jurisdiction
to hear these cases.
The facts in Serrano Cruz transpired during the internal armed conflict in El
Salvador, which extended from 1980-1991. Between 27 May and 9 June 1982, the
Atlacad Battalion carried out a military operation known as 'Operaci6n Limpieza' or
'la Guinda de Mayo' in several municipalities of the Department of Chalatenango,
including San Antonio de la Cruz where the two victims in this case, Ernestina and
Erlinda Serrano Cruz, and their next of kin resided. As a result of this operation,
members of the Serrano Cruz family left the village to protect their life. Only the
mother of the victims and one of their siblings were able to pass through the military
forces that surrounded the village. The remaining of the Serrano Cruz family,
including the father, Ernestina, Erlinda and two of their siblings, escaped into the
mountains toward a close village, where they arrived after walking for days. While
hiding from the military forces, Ernestina and Erlinda remained alone as their
father and brother went to look for water and their sister relocated to a different
place to avoid risking the security of the whole family with her crying baby. The
victims in this case were discovered and later taken by soldiers from the Atlacatl
Battalion. Since then, the fate of Ernestina and Erlina, who were 7 and 3 when
kidnapped, remains unknown. After the end of the conflict in El Salvador, the girls'
parents initiated judicial actions to investigate their destiny to no avail.
2 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Herrera Ulloa Case,Judgement of 2 July 2004, Series C, No.
107, para. 87; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Tibi Case, Judgement of 7 September 2004,
Series C, No. 114, para. 55; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Serrano Cruz Case, Preliminary
Objections, Judgement of 23 November 2004, Series C, No. 118, para. 141.
See Article 44 of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court.
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judgement of 24 January 1998, Series C, No. 36.
5 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Trujillo Oroza Case, Judgement of 26 January 2000, Series
C, No. 64.
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Molina Theissen Case, Judgement of 4 May 2004, Series C,
No. 106.
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Before the Inter-American Court, petitioners and the Commission argued that
the facts in this case entailed a forced disappearance and in consequence they
alleged violations to the rights to life (Article 4), not to be tortured (Article 5), and
liberty (Article 7), in connection with Article 1(1) of the American Convention. In
addition, they argued violations of the rights to due process and effective remedy
(Articles 8 and 25), the rights of the family, right to a name and the right of the child
(Articles 17, 18, and 19) in connection with Article 1(1) of that treaty.
Among others, the State challenged thejurisdiction of the Court on the basis of a
temporal restriction incorporated in its declaration recognising the compulsory
jurisdiction of this tribunal. The limitation stated that El Salvador accepted the
jurisdiction of the Court only in regard to cases arising out of events subsequent to,
and out of acts which began to be committed after, the date of deposit of its
declaration of acceptance. El Salvador submitted its acceptance of the jurisdiction of
the Court on 6June 1995.
In regard to this argument, the Court first stated that Article 62(2) expressly
authorises States to restrict the scope of their acceptance of the jurisdiction of this
tribunal. However, the Court has the power to decide whether States' restrictions are
compatible with the American Convention. Moreover, this power is not overcome by
the fact that other State Members of the Organization of American States have not
objected to the legality of the restriction. Next, the Court acknowledged the
application of the principle of non-retroactivity enshrined in Article 28 of the
Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties to States' acceptance of its jurisdiction.
In that regard, the Court stated that this tribunal will only exercise jurisdiction in
relation to facts that happened after that acceptance, except in the case of a
'continuous violation'.
In applying these principles to the restriction under analysis, the Court
established that the limitation was compatible with the American Convention
because Article 62(2) authorises temporal restrictions. It is relevant to note in regard
to this holding that the Court, in previous cases, has suggested that Article 62(2)
included an exhaustive list of permissible restrictions therefore making invalid any
limitation not specifically enumerated in that provision.7 By reading the language of
Article 62(2), however, it is not apparent that the temporal restriction incorporated
by El Salvador fits clearly in the restrictions stated in that provision.
Finally, the Court concluded that it lacks jurisdiction to hear the facts of the case
related to the disappearance of the minors, in particular the alleged violations to
Articles 4, 5, 7 and 1(1) because they arose out of acts which began to be committed
before the date of deposit of El Salvador's acceptance to its jurisdiction. However,
the Court found that it has jurisdiction to hear the facts related to the lack of
appropriate investigation into the disappearance of the victims since several
remedies were submitted after the date of such acceptance. Therefore, it concluded
that it would review the alleged violations to Articles 8 and 25, in relation to 1(1) of
the American Convention. In relation to the alleged violations to Articles 17, 18 and
19 of the American Convention, the Court found in a later decision on the merits
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear these complaints since they arose out of acts which
began to be committed before the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court by El
' See, for example, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Ivcher Bronsitein Case, Judgement of
24 September 1999, Series C, No. 54, para. 36.
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Salvador. In that decision, however, the Court found jurisdiction to hear the alleged
violation of Article 5 of the Convention in regard to the victims' next of kin.
3. THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
In 2004 the Court decided Herrera Ulloa vs Costa Rica and Canese vs Paraguay, in
which, for the first time, it defined the scope of permissible restrictions to the right
of freedom of expression when a public figure or public matters are at stake. In light
of existing case law developed by other international human rights systems, in
particular the European Human Rights System, the Inter-American Court held that
under Article 13 of the American Convention, States must provide a higher
threshold of protection to speech that promotes the debate on issues regarding
public figures and public affairs.
In Herrera Ulloa, the petitioner was ajournalist who worked in the political section
of La Nacion, a well reputable newspaper in Costa Rica. From May to December 1995,
Mr. Herrera Ulloa wrote several articles, which included partial reproductions of
information published by some European newspapers regarding a Costa Rican
diplomat who represented Costa Rica before the International Organization of
Atomic Energy. The articles reported that Mr. F61ix Przedborski, the diplomat
representing Costa Rica on a pro bono basis, was involved in several illicit acts,
particularly related to corruption and similar charges. In reaction to the publication
of the articles in La Nacion, Mr. Przedborski brought criminal and civil actions
against thejournalist who wrote the pieces and sued the newspaper for civil damages
alleging that his reputation had been affected by the information published by La
Nacion.
Mr. Herrera Ulloa was convicted and found guilty of defamation. He was ordered
to pay a fine and publish the paragraphs of the judgement that stated his liability in
the newspaper's section where the controversial articles were reported. Moreover,
he was found civilly liable together with La Nacion and ordered to pay damages to the
plaintiff in the case. In addition, this judgement ordered La Nacion to replace the
link between the articles and Mr. Przedborski's name in its online edition with a new
link between the articles and the paragraphs of the decision that stated liability.
Finally, Mr. Herrera Ulloa had to register his name in the 'National Register for
Delinquents', as established in Costa Rican domestic legislation for those who have
been convicted of criminal offenses.
Before the Inter-American Court, petitioners and the Commission argued the
violation of several rights protected by the American Convention on Human Rights,
including Articles 13 and 2, which enshrine the right to freedom of expression and
the duty to adopt domestic legislative or other measures to ensure the rights
protected in that treaty, respectively. First the Court emphasised that the issue at
stake was not whether the publication of the articles violated domestic legislation,
but if the criminal and civil convictions given to Mr. Herrera Ulloa violated his right
to freedom of expression as protected by the American Convention. Second, the
Court reinforced its previous case law stating that the right to freedom of expression
under the American Convention has an individual and social dimension. These dual
dimensions require the State to ensure that no one is arbitrarily limited or impeded
in expressing his or her own thoughts and to respect the collective right to receive
any information and to have access to the thoughts expressed by others. Then, the
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 23/2 (2005) 291
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Court underscored the importance of freedom of expression for the consolidation
of a democratic society and the central role that the media and journalists play in
ensuring the exercise of the collective right to freedom of expression.
Next, the Court analysed whether, in light of the protection afforded by Article 13
of the American Convention, the criminal and civil sanctions imposed upon Mr.
Ulloa were permissible restrictions to his right to freedom of expression. In this
respect, the Court held that for these restrictions to be permissible they must: 1) be
expressly established by law; 2) pursue a legitimate goal, such as preserving the
reputation of others, national security, public order, or public health and morals;
and 3) be necessary in a democratic society. In following the case law developed by
the European Court, the Court stated that 'necessary in a democratic society' must
be interpreted as satisfying a 'pressing social need'.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that, under Article 13(2) of the American
Convention, speech related to public officials or other persons who exercise public
functions must be afforded a wider margin of protection due to its crucial role in
promoting democratic control through public opinion about the transparency of
the government and the conduct of governmental actors. Though public officials
still enjoy the protection of their reputation, the scope of this protection must be
established in accordance with the principles of democratic pluralism. Public
officials or those exercising public functions have voluntarily exposed themselves to
close scrutiny and greater criticism since they have left the private sphere and
entered the sphere of public debate.
In applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Court held that the civil
and criminal sanctions given to Mr. Herrera Ulloa were incompatible with
Article 13(2) of the Convention because the articles published by the petitioner
related to a public official, an Ambassador of Costa Rica, and to issues of public
interest, namely the activities carried out by this official while enjoying the
immunities and other privileges provided by the State as a result of his position. In
addition, the conviction of the petitioner was based on the fact that he could not
prove the truthfulness of the information reported in the articles, thereby imposing
an excessive limitation to this right to freedom of expression. The consequence of
this sanction created a restriction which is not permitted by Article 13(2) because it
carried a dissuasive and frightening effect upon journalists, hindering the debate on
issues of public interest for society.
Though the Court found a violation of Article 13 of the American Convention, it
decided not to rule on the application of Article 2 of that treaty, thereby rejecting
the opportunity to pronounce on whether Costa Rican legislation authorising the
imposition of sanctions tojournalists who report on public figures or issues of public
interest is compatible with the Convention.
In Canese vs Paraguay, the Court addressed a violation to Article 13, but in the
context of speech delivered in a political campaign. Mr. Ricardo Canese, the
petitioner in this case, is an engineer and an expert on the Itaipu Hidroelectric Power
Plant, a binational undertaking by Brazil and Paraguay. In 1993, Mr. Canese was
nominated as a presidential candidate by Asunci6n para Todos, a civic movement.
During the campaign the petitioner was interviewed by two newspapers in regard to
Mr. Juan Carlos Wasmosy, the leading candidate in the election contest. In those
interviews, Mr. Canese indicated that Mr. Wasmosy had earned his wealth as a result
of his association to President Stroessner, a former dictator. Moreover, he stated that
Mr. Wasmosy's relationship with Stroessner had secured him the presidency of
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CONEMPA, a Paraguayan company engaged in the construction of ITAIPU and
which gave substantial bribes to Stroessner. Mr. Wasmosy was later elected President
of Paraguay.
Three months after the publication of the interview by the Noticias and ABC
newspapers, Mr. Canese was sued for defamation by members of the Board of
Directors of CONEMPA. The plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Canese's statements were
defamatory for the company and affected them personally in their position as
directors of CONEMPA. Mr. Canese was convicted for defamation, given four
months imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine and civil damages. Also, he was
impeded from leaving his country as a consequence of the criminal sanction
imposed upon him.8
Similarly to Herrera Ulloa, the Court underlined the dual dimension of the right
to freedom of expression under the American Convention and the importance of
this right for the consolidation of a democratic society. In addition, it underscored
the relevance of freedom of expression in the context of a political campaign as an
essential tool to promote the education of the electorate, strengthen the political
debate among participating candidates and political parties, and assist in scrutini-
sing the platforms presented by the candidates, thereby allowing for greater
transparency and control of the elected authorities. The Court concluded that it is
crucial to protect and ensure the political debate that precedes the election of
national authorities and that consequently, the free exchange of ideas and
information regarding candidates and political parties among the media, the other
candidates and political parties as well as other interested persons must be
guaranteed.
Next, the Court stated that Mr. Canese's statements in regard to CONEMPA
relate to issues of public interest and that they were made in the context of a political
campaign, with respect to a presidential candidate who was a public figure and with
the intention of challenging the character of this candidate to become president of
the country. Furthermore, the Court restated the principles set out in Herrera Ulloa
and indicated that, under Article 13(2) of the American Convention, speech related
to public officials or other persons who exercise public functions must be afforded a
wider margin of protection due to its crucial role in promoting democracy.
Moreover, though public officials enjoy the protection of their reputation, the scope
of this protection must be established in accordance with the principles of
democratic pluralism. Public officials or those exercising public functions have
voluntarily exposed themselves to close scrutiny and greater criticism since they have
left the private sphere and entered in the sphere of public debate. Therefore, in the
context of a political debate, public officials, politicians and even private persons
who carry out activities subject to public scrutiny must accept a broader margin of
tolerance for criticism than that afforded to private individuals.
In applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Court held that the
conviction of Mr. Canese and the restriction from leaving his country imposed, as a
result of statements made in the context of an electoral campaign and in regard to
another candidate was an unnecessary and excessive sanction. Moreover, these
measures restricted the open debate in regard to issues of public interest and limited
* The conviction for defamation and civil liability as well as the order not to leave the country were
later reversed by the Supreme Court of Paraguay, after the case had been submitted for
consideration to the Inter-American Court.
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the enjoyment of Mr Canese's right of freedom of expression for the remaining of
the political campaign. In consequence, the Court concluded that there was no
pressing social need in this case that would justify the restrictions applied to the
petitioner in the case and therefore the sanctions imposed upon Mr. Canese were
disproportionate to the aim they pursued. Lastly, the Court found that the sanctions
also constituted indirect means of restrictions on the petitioner's right to freedom of
expression. Thus, the Court found a violation of Articles 13(2) and 13(3) of the
American Convention.
Similarly to Herrera Ulloa, the Court also decided not to pronounce itself on the
alleged violation of Article 2 of the American Convention.
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